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Softwood Lumber’s “Termite” Problem

1

WHY THE EXTENSION OF THE 2006 SOFTWOOD
LUMBER AGREEMENT IS RIGHT FOR SOFTWOOD
LUMBER BUT WRONG FOR THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
On January 24, 2012, United States Trade Representative
Ron Kirk and Canadian Minister for International Trade Ed Fast
signed a two-year extension of the 2006 Softwood Lumber
Agreement (SLA 2006),2 extending the agreement through
October 12, 2015.3 The SLA 2006 governs the most notorious
trade dispute in the history of Canadian-American relations: the
Canada-United States softwood lumber dispute.4 The softwood
lumber dispute centers on allegations by the United States that
the Canadian government unfairly subsidizes its softwood

1

See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW
PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE xii (2008).
2
Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Can., Sept. 12, 2006, Temp. State
Dep’t No. 07-222, KAV 8209, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3254 (last
visited Nov. 21, 2012), amended by Agreement Between the Government of Canada
and the Government of the United States of America Amending the Softwood Lumber
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America, U.S.-Can., Oct. 12, 2006, Temp. State Dep’t No. 07-223, KAV 8310,
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/
Agreementamending-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter SLA 2006].
3
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America Extending the Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, as Amended,
U.S.-Can., Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/softwood-bois_
oeuvre/other-autres/SLA_2012.aspx?lang=eng&view=d (last visited May 16, 2012).
4
See e.g., GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN HO
UHM, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 553 (2010) (“The softwood lumber dispute
between the United States and Canada represents the longest-running and perhaps most
bitter trade dispute ever between the two countries.”); DAOWEI ZHANG, THE SOFTWOOD
LUMBER WAR: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LONG U.S.-CANADIAN TRADE DISPUTE 1
(2007) (“Since the value of softwood lumber trade currently exceeds US$7 billion
annually, this disagreement easily ranks as the largest trade dispute between the two
countries in the modern era, and its longevity has defied many seasoned observers.”).
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lumber industry, allowing Canadian lumber producers to dump
their products into the U.S. market at below production cost.5
In large part, these allegations stem from the countries’
differing systems of forest management.6 In the United States,
forest land is mostly privately owned, and market forces
generally determine the stumpage fees harvesters must pay for
timber.7 In Canada, because the majority of its forests are
considered public land, provincial governments set the fees
that harvesters must pay.8 Many U.S. lumber producers believe
that the Canadian system qualifies as a subsidy, by creating
“chronically below-market-value stumpage charges,”9 and have
long urged the U.S. government to impose countervailing
(CVD) and antidumping (AD) duties on imports of Canadian
softwood products.10 Their claims have led to nearly three
decades of litigation.11
This dispute should be of particular concern to both
Canadians and Americans alike, as Canada is currently the
United States’ largest trading partner in goods, with the two

5

See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, U.S. Coalition
for Fair Lumber Imports Demands Relief from Canadian Subsidies, Dumping (Apr. 2,
2001), available at http://www.uslumbercoalition.org/doc/4_2_01release.pdf [hereinafter
Coalition Demands].
6
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 556 (“In the United States, some 70% of
timberlands are privately owned. In Canada, in contrast, 94% of the forests are on
provincial or federal government (‘Crown’) lands.”).
7
Michael Hart & Bill Dymond, The Cul-de-Sac of Softwood Lumber, 26
POL’Y OPTIONS no. 9, 2005, at 20. “Stumpage [fees]” are what lumber companies must
pay for the right to harvest timber. Id. at 19.
8
Id. at 19-20.
9
Henry Spelter, If America Had Canada’s Stumpage System, 52 FOREST SCI.
443, 444 (2006). Spelter believes that it is “unclear whether this is a subsidy in the
sense that the [NAFTA] and [WTO] agreements were meant to deal with, i.e., direct
financial aid furnished by a government.” Id.
10
See, e.g., Coalition Demands, supra note 5. In the United States, a
domestic industry that believes it is being injured by way of a foreign government
subsidizing foreign exporters or a foreign producer dumping an export in the United
States at a price lower than its home market price may file a petition with both the
International Trade Administration, which is part of the Department of Commerce
(Commerce), and the International Trade Commission (ITC), which is an independent
agency. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, An Introduction to U.S. Trade Remedies, IMP. ADMIN.,
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/intro/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). Commerce determines
whether the import is, in fact, being subsidized or dumped into the market, while the
ITC determines whether the import is causing material injury, or threatening to cause
an injury, to the domestic industry. Id. “If both Commerce and the ITC make
affirmative findings . . . , Commerce instructs U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[(CBP)] to assess duties against imports of that product into the United States.” Id.
11
Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982–2006), FOREIGN
AFFAIRS & INT’L TRADE CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/softwoodbois_oeuvre/notices-avis/82-06.aspx?lang=eng&view=d (last modified Apr. 20, 2009).
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countries trading over $597 billion during 2011 alone.12 More
specifically, Canada has historically been the largest source of
lumber imports in the United States.13
Culminating with the SLA 2006, the most recent
developments in the softwood lumber dispute resulted from
what commentators have labeled a “hydra” of litigation.14
Disputes were settled under Chapters 11 and 19 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system, and within
U.S. domestic courts.15 This overlap is a result of the
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)16 within
the international trading system, which enable parties to seek
recourse under multiple dispute settlement regimes.17 Although
NAFTA contains a choice of forum clause intended to prevent
overlap in dispute settlement,18 the clause does not apply to
final AD or CVD determinations, such as those at issue in the
12

Top Trading Partners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1112yr.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
13
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 553.
14
John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 429, 436 (2006).
15
See infra Part II.
16
Preferential trade agreements (also referred to as “regional trade
agreements”) are agreements by which “parties to [the agreement] offer to each
other . . . more favorable treatment in trade matters than [what is offered] to the rest of
the world, including WTO Members.” Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of Regional
Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L.
597, 600 (2011). PTAs are a “departure from the WTO [most-favored nation] principle
of non-discrimination,” but are WTO-consistent under three rules: (i) GATT Article
XXIV:4-10; (ii) the Enabling Clause, and (3) GATT Article V. Id. at 602. The majority of
PTAs are in the form of free trade agreements (FTAs), such as NAFTA. BHAGWATI,
supra note 1, at 1. Because even those commentators who use the term “regional trade
agreements” admit that these agreements “may be . . . concluded between countries not
necessarily located in the same geographic region,” I believe that PTAs is a more
accurate label. Leal-Arcas, supra, at 600. Between 1985 and 2005, the share of world
trade that came from PTAs grew from approximately 20% to around 50%. Id. at 602. To
date, various states have notified over 500 PTAs to the WTO Secretariat and numerous
others are currently under negotiation. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2012). Of the 233 PTAs currently in force, approximately 85% are FTAs such as
NAFTA. See List of All RTAs, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
17
Jennifer Hillman, Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO—What Should the WTO Do?, 42 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 193, 194 (2009) (noting the “problems that can arise from the overlap or
conflict between these RTA settlement provisions and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding of the WTO”).
18
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United Mexican States, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2005(6), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612, 695
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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softwood lumber dispute.19 More generally, there is little clarity
on the exact legal relationship between PTA and WTO dispute
settlement systems.20 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Article XXIV addresses only the “formation” of PTAs and
is silent on issues pertaining to the operational relationship
between PTAs and the WTO.21 Moreover, there is no overarching
statute that defines the authority of one tribunal in relation to
another.22 This uncertainty is directly linked to the superfluous
litigation discussed below.
The growth of PTAs has several explanations—most
notably the stalled Doha Round of multilateral trade
negotiations23—and the impact PTAs have on the multilateral
trading system is much debated.24 This debate is beyond the
scope of the instant analysis. For the purposes of this note, which
examines a PTA sub-agreement (the SLA 2006),25 I have accepted
the position that PTAs undercut the multilateral trading system.
The extension of the SLA 2006 raises two important
questions: first, what does it mean for the softwood lumber
dispute itself; and, second, what does it mean for the
multilateral trading system as a whole? Put differently, if PTAs
such as NAFTA are the “termites” of the multilateral trading
system,26 can an agreement spawned from NAFTA’s own failures
act as an insecticide, helping to exterminate these preferential
19

Id. at art. 2004. Parties have also been reluctant to rely on NAFTA Article
2005 even outside the context of AD and CVD cases. Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo
Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible
Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 89 (2009).
20
Hillman, supra note 17, at 197.
21
Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 452
(2001). The Doha Declaration includes a negotiating mandate to clarify and improve
“disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional
trade agreements.” World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, ¶ 29,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
22
Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 19, at 84.
23
Leal-Arcas, supra note 16, at 621-23 (listing other economic and political
reasons why countries agree to PTAs so frequently); see also BHAGWATI, supra note 1,
at 16-47 (listing the “many reasons why PTAs have now turned into a pandemic and a
pox on the world trading system”).
24
See, e.g., Cho, supra note 21, at 429-35; Leal-Arcas, supra note 16, at 623-26.
25
The term “PTA sub-agreement” is meant to describe a trade agreement
between two countries that have already agreed to a PTA. In this analysis, the PTA
sub-agreement at issue is the SLA 2006, between Canada and the United States who
are both members of NAFTA.
26
BHAGWATI, supra note 1, at xii (“Acting like termites, PTAs are eating
away at the multilateral trading system relentlessly and progressively.”). But see LealArcas, supra note 16, at 629 (arguing that RTAs can “complement” multilateralism). I
should note that termites seem like an especially suitable analogy when discussing a
trade agreement dealing with softwood lumber.
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agreements? Or, does such an agreement only add to the forces
undercutting the long-term prospects for multilateralism?
This note will argue that parties directly involved in the
Canadian-American softwood lumber trade should welcome the
extension of the SLA 2006. But this support should come with
pause—especially for those who wish to see the global trading
community return more ardently to the multilateral system.
While the streamlined dispute settlement process of the SLA
200627 has thus far proven to be the most effective solution to
the lumber saga, this is only because the alternative monstrous
“hydra” of litigation is impracticable. A workable resolution to
NAFTA’s largest and most bitter dispute that fails to directly
address the systemic shortcomings of PTAs will only
temporarily insulate the parties from the underlying problems
and will draw their attention further away from wholesale
multilateralism.28 The SLA 2006 is not a grand solution for the
problems of the multilateral trading system.
This note is divided into five sections. Part I describes
the early history of the softwood lumber dispute from 1982 to
2001. Part II highlights the superfluous litigation that occurred
between 2001 and 2006, which culminated in the SLA 2006.
This section provides a brief overview of the disputes that
occurred within NAFTA, the WTO, and U.S. domestic courts,
and it highlights the problems that were caused by these
overlapping dispute settlement mechanisms. Part III provides
an overview of the SLA 2006 and briefly addresses the disputes
that have arisen under this agreement. Part IV explains why the
SLA 2006 is the most practical solution to the softwood lumber
dispute, arguing that a negotiated agreement with a
straightforward dispute settlement mechanism is necessary to
offset the United States’ stubborn political protection of its
softwood lumber industry. Finally, Part V explains how the
softwood lumber dispute highlights the shortcomings of PTAs
and argues that, in the case of NAFTA, taking lumber out of the
equation removes a major incentive to correct these deficiencies.

27

SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XIV.
See Michael S. Valihora, NAFTA Chapter 19 or the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body: A Hobson’s Choice for Canada?, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 447, 471
(1998). (“Perhaps the Softwood Lumber Dispute is simply too big for [NAFTA Chapter
19], but the mechanism is sufficient in most circumstances.”). This point, made in 1998,
highlights both the atypical size of the softwood lumber dispute, and the shortcomings
of NAFTA. A dispute settlement mechanism that is “sufficient in most circumstances”
is, by its nature, patently insufficient.
28
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THE EARLY BATTLES—THE HISTORY OF THE SOFTWOOD
LUMBER DISPUTE (1982–2001)

The modern history of the softwood lumber dispute is
best understood as four discrete “battles”29: Lumber I (1982–
1983), Lumber II (1986–1991), Lumber III (1991–1996), and
Lumber IV (2001–2006).30 As one commentator suggests, this
history “involves extremely arcane points of anti-dumping and
countervailing duty law and an extraordinarily convoluted
litigation history.”31 Despite the protracted nature of the
dispute, it is important to address each stage in order to
understand how and why wood has been the source of a thirtyyear trade war. Accordingly, this note will briefly address
Lumber I, II, and III below.32 This note will discuss Lumber IV
in greater detail in Part II, given that it culminated in the
agreement that is the focus of this note: the SLA 2006.33
A.

Lumber I (1982–1983)

Lumber I began in 1982 when a coalition of U.S. lumber
producers, later known as the Coalition for Fair Lumber
Imports (Lumber Coalition), filed a CVD petition with the
Department of Commerce (Commerce).34 The petition alleged
that the Canadian government subsidized softwood lumber
through various programs that set artificially low stumpage
rates for Canadian producers.35 Commerce initiated an
investigation, but it eventually determined that no subsidy
existed within the meaning of domestic CVD law and dismissed

29

BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 554. Other commentators describe the
dispute as “A War between Friends.” See ZHANG, supra note 4, at 1.
30
Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982–2006), supra note
11. For the purposes of this note, I address Lumber IV as beginning with the expiration
of the 1996 Canada-United States Softwood Lumber Agreement, which occurred on
March 31, 2001. Id.
31
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA. L.
REV. 319, 320 (2007).
32
Other sources provide excellent summaries of the early history of the
dispute in much greater detail. See, e.g., BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 556-69;
ZHANG, supra note 4, at 24-165; Kevin C. Kennedy, A Legal History of the Softwood
Lumber Dispute (in a Nutshell), 52 FOREST SCI. 432, 432-36 (2006).
33
See infra Part II.
34
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations;
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878 (Nov. 3, 1982);
see also supra note 10 (discussing CVD laws).
35
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878.
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the petition.36 Lumber I is the only round of the softwood
lumber dispute that did not produce a negotiated settlement.37
B.

Lumber II (1986–1991)

The peace that Lumber I established was short-lived. In
1986, the Lumber Coalition filed a second CVD petition, but
this time Commerce issued an affirmative preliminary
determination, ruling that Canada’s provincial stumpage
programs constituted a 15% subsidy.38 Although an affirmative
preliminary determination is usually followed by a final
determination, no final determination was reached in Lumber
II.39 Rather, the investigation was suspended when Canada and
the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) in December 1986, where Canada agreed to impose a
15% tax on exports of softwood lumber to the United States,
which Canada could proportionately phase out if the provinces
increased their stumpage fees.40 Despite this agreement, both
governments reserved their positions as to whether Canada’s
stumpage programs qualified as subsidies.41 As a result, the
conflict at the root of the dispute remained unresolved.
By 1991, Canada’s major lumber exporting provinces
had independently increased their stumpage fees and,
pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Canada eliminated the
export tax for exports from British Columbia and lowered it to
3.1% for exports from Quebec.42 Nevertheless, high-level
Canadian officials remained dissatisfied with the agreement.
In October 1991, armed with a new dispute settlement
36

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determinations: Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,159
(May 31, 1983) (finding that the subsidies were “de minimis” and therefore did not
constitute subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930). CVDs
may only be imposed if the countervailable subsidy is above a de minimis level.
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 128. The standard de minimis threshold for CVD
investigations is 1%. Id.
37
David Quayat, The Forest for the Trees: A Roadmap to Canada’s Litigation
Experience in Lumber IV, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 115, 122 (2009).
38
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453
(Oct. 22, 1986).
39
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 134.
40
See Statement Regarding the Agreement Between the United States and
Canada Concerning Trade in Certain Softwood Lumber Products with Memorandum of
Understanding, Agreed Minute and Related Letters, U.S.-Can., Dec. 30, 1986, Temp.
State Dep’t No. 87-31, KAV 272, at [i].
41
Id. ¶ 3(b).
42
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 560.
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provision under the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CUSFTA)—which permitted review of adverse
AD/CVD determinations directly to a binational panel43—
Canada terminated the MOU.44 The United States’ reaction was
both “swift and unprecedented,”45 and Lumber III was launched
before the end of the month.
C.

Lumber III and the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement
(1991–2001)

Although Canada’s termination of the MOU should have
come with little surprise to U.S. officials, Commerce’s swift
response was indicative of its disappointment with Canada’s
decision.46 On October 31, 1991, Commerce took the exceptional
step of self-initiating a CVD investigation for the first time in its
history.47 Unlike in Lumber II, Commerce eventually reached a
final affirmative subsidy determination, which was soon
followed by a final affirmative injury determination by the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC).48 As a result of these
rulings, Canadian lumber exporters faced an unprecedented
CVD of 6.51% on all products entering the U.S. market.49
43

Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., ch. 19, Dec. 22,
1987, 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988). The Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement
(CUSFTA) was a predecessor to NAFTA. Quayat, supra note 37, at 123. During the
negotiations for the CUSFTA, AD/CVD were a source of much controversy. Canada
wished to see AD/CVD eliminated, and the United States was intent on retaining them.
Knox, supra note 14, at 434. The result was that the parties were allowed to seek
review of adverse AD/CVD determinations directly to a binational panel, rather than to
the domestic court of the country imposing the duties. Id. Despite the fact that this was
meant only to serve as a temporary solution, NAFTA negotiators included it with only
“minor modifications.” Id.
44
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 560.
45
Quayat, supra note 37, at 123.
46
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 560-61.
47
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Self-Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,055
(Oct. 31, 1991); Kennedy, supra note 32, at 434. A CVD investigation is usually
initiated by an industry petition. See supra note 10.
48
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570
(May 28, 1992); Softwood Lumber from Canada, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414, 731-TA-928, 57
Fed. Reg. 31389 (July 15, 1992) (final). Under U.S. CVD laws, both a finding of an
actionable subsidy and a finding of a material injury are required to apply CVDs. See
supra note 10.
49
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570.
Commerce found two types of subsidies—stumpage programs and log export
regulations—and determined that they resulted in a net subsidy of 6.51% ad valorem.
Id. at 22,570, 22,580, 22,604. Softwood Lumber I ended when Commerce determined
that no countervailable subsidy existed. See supra Part I.A. Softwood Lumber II ended
with the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding. See supra Part I.B.
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This, however, was only the beginning of Lumber III. The
defining characteristic of the modern state of the softwood
lumber dispute is a seemingly endless, often controversial course
of litigation. And as a sign of things to come, Canada responded
by exercising its rights under the recently enacted dispute
settlement mechanisms of the CUSFTA and seeking panel
review of the United States’ use of trade remedies against its
exports of softwood lumber.50 Canada appealed both the ITC’s
injury determination51 and Commerce’s subsidy determination.52
These appeals were resolved largely in Canada’s favor.
First, in reviewing the affirmative injury determination,
the CUSFTA panel rejected the ITC’s finding of material injury
and remanded the issue for reconsideration.53 Despite the ITC’s
multiple attempts to address the panel’s concerns on remand,
the CUSFTA panel continued to rule in Canada’s favor.54
Similarly, in reviewing Commerce’s affirmative subsidy
determination, the CUSFTA panel found that a number of
Commerce’s findings were unsupported by law and remanded
the issue to Commerce for further consideration.55 After one
remand, the CUSFTA panel ruled along national lines, with a
Canadian majority finding that Commerce’s determinations
were again unsupported by U.S. law and remanding with
instructions that Commerce make a determination consistent
with the panel’s finding that no countervailable subsidy existed.56
50

Chapter 19 is a dispute resolution mechanism that replaces U.S. or
Canadian judicial review of final AD/CVD determinations with a binational panel. See
supra note 43.
51
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In
the Matter of: Softwood Lumber from Canada, Reviewing the Final Determinations of
the U.S. International Trade Commission, at 1, USA-92-1904-02 (July 26, 1993)
[hereinafter Lumber III Injury CUSFTA Panel Decision].
52
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In
the Matter Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 1, USA-92-1904-01
(May 6, 1993) [hereinafter Lumber III Subsidy CUSFTA Panel Decision].
53
Lumber III Injury CUSFTA Panel Decision, supra note 51, at 20
(concluding that “the [U.S. International Trade] Commission’s determination of
material injury by reason of subsidized Canadian imports is not supported by
substantial evidence on the record,” and remanding “the Commission’s final
determination for reconsideration”).
54
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In
the Matter of: Softwood Lumber from Canada, at 8, USA-92-1904-02 (July 6, 1994);
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the Matter
of: Softwood Lumber from Canada, Decision of the Panel on Review of the Remand
Determination of the U.S. International Trade Commission, at 35, USA-92-1904-02
(Jan. 28, 1994).
55
Lumber III Subsidy CUSFTA Panel Decision, supra note 52, at 147.
56
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In
the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 7-8, USA-92-1904-01
(Dec. 17, 1993).
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Adding to the controversy, the United States appealed
the panel’s ruling to an Extraordinary Challenge Committee
(ECC).57 The United States alleged that the panel “exceeded its
powers, authority and jurisdiction by ignoring the Chapter 19
standard of review” and that certain members of the panel were
in “a serious conflict of interest.”58 Ultimately, in another vote
running along national lines, the ECC dismissed the United
States’ challenges.59 Despite this ruling, Lumber III continued.
Although the United States agreed to revoke its CVD
order, terminate the collection of all duties, and refund
approximately $800 million that Canadian softwood lumber
importers had paid,60 Congress responded to the ECC decision by
amending U.S. trade law in a manner that “effectively
neutralized” the CUSFTA panel findings on subsidy and injury.61
Shortly after the passage of these amendments, and
with the Lumber Coalition poised to file a new CVD petition,62
the United States and Canada began negotiating an agreement
to resolve Lumber III. The two countries eventually signed the
1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA 1996),63 and in
exchange for Canada’s commitment to reduce its lumber

57

Although Chapter 19 decisions are binding and cannot be appealed in
national courts, the ECC may reverse a panel finding where a member of the panel is
“guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest,” or where a panel
“seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure” or “manifestly exceeded its
powers.” NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 1904(13).
58
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Extraordinary Challenge
Proceeding, In the Matter of: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 1112, ECC-94-1904-01 USA (Aug. 3, 1994) (Opinion of Mr. Justice Gordon L.S. Hart).
59
Id. at 33 (Opinion of the Hon. Herbert B. Morgan). Judge Malcolm Wilkey,
the retired Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, dissented and accused the panel of
substituting its judgment for what U.S. law should be, rather than deferring to what
U.S. law was, as required by the Chapter 19 standard of review. Id. at 11 (Dissenting
Opinion of U.S. Circuit Judge (Ret.) Malcolm Wilkey) (“The United States never
contemplated that United States law would be changed by a binational body. If the
[Chapter 19] appellate system does not achieve similar results in applying U.S. law, it
may not be long continued.”). Despite fears of national bias, as of 2006, the Lumber III
review remained the only instance under Chapter 19 where binational panels have
split along national lines. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 435.
60
Notice of Panel Decision, Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order and
Termination of Suspension of Liquidation, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,029 (Aug. 16, 1994); Drew
Fagan & Barrie McKenna, Softwood Duties Coming Home: U.S. to Return About $800million to Canadian Exporters, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Dec. 3, 1994, at B1.
61
Quayat, supra note 37, at 125; see also Kennedy, supra note 32, at 435.
62
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 565.
63
Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S-Can., May 29, 1996, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/treaty-e.pdf (last
visited Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter SLA 1996].
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exports to the United States through a soft quota,64 the United
States agreed not to initiate any new trade actions.65 Few
disputes arose under the SLA 1996,66 but, despite a provision
for extending the agreement,67 Canada and the United States
failed to agree to the terms of an extension. Accordingly, the
agreement expired on March 31, 2001.68
While the disputes under Lumber I, II, and III are
telling examples of a “[w]ar between [f]riends,”69 not until
Lumber IV did it become painstakingly clear that the region’s
foremost trade agreement, NAFTA, was incapable of providing
a Softwood Lumber armistice.
II.

THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER “HYDRA”70—LUMBER IV (2001–
2006)

Canada deployed what has been aptly described as an
“exhaustive” litigation strategy in Lumber IV.71 Following
another round of AD/CVD petitions from the Lumber Coalition,72
a “hydra” of litigation ensued under NAFTA Chapters 11 and 19,
the WTO dispute settlement system, and U.S. domestic trade
law.73 These challenges, which are addressed below,74 created a
chaotic overlap between dispute settlement processes that
ultimately pushed the parties toward a negotiated settlement in
the form of the SLA 2006. Although this agreement
64

Canada was entitled to ship 14.7 billion board feet of lumber duty free
annually. Amounts shipped in excess of the amount were subject to a series of
escalating export taxes. Id. at art. II(2).
65
Id. at art. I.
66
Sarah E. Lysons, Comment, Resolving the Softwood Lumber Dispute, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 421 (2009).
67
SLA 1996, supra note 63, at art. X.
68
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 569.
69
ZHANG, supra note 4, at 1.
70
Knox, supra note 14, at 436.
71
Quayat, supra note 37, at 126.
72
In a move that demonstrates why parties directly involved in the
Canadian-American softwood lumber trade should welcome the extension of the SLA
2006, it took all of one business day after the expiration of the SLA 1996 for the
Lumber Coalition to file fresh AD/CVD petitions. BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 569.
73
Knox, supra note 14, at 436.
74
The futility of overlapping dispute-settlement mechanisms is best
highlighted through a focus on the concurrent litigation that occurred under NAFTA
and the WTO with regards to the United States’ determination that Canada had
subsidized its lumber industry. See, e.g., Sydney M. Cone III, Canadian Softwood
Lumber and “Free Trade” Under NAFTA, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 840 (2006-2007).
These forums, therefore, are discussed first and in the greatest detail. The subsequent
discussions regarding dumping determinations, NAFTA Chapter 11, and disputes
within the U.S. domestic legal system serve to underscore the convoluted nature of the
multilateral trading system’s various dispute settlement mechanisms.
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acknowledges the systemic shortcomings of PTAs and the
overlapping dispute settlement mechanisms they create, the SLA
2006’s failure to address these issues head on does more to add to
the forces undercutting multilateralism than it does to resolve
the issues that created the need for an agreement.
A.

Are Two Heads Better than One?—Canada’s Challenges to
the United States’ Subsidy Determinations Under NAFTA
Chapter 19 and the WTO Dispute Settlement System

Following the Lumber Coalition’s newest AD/CVD
petitions, Commerce and the ITC made final affirmative
determinations that Canada was subsidizing its softwood lumber
industry75 and that the subsidized Canadian softwood lumber
imports presented a threat of material injury to the U.S. lumber
industry.76 Canada sought review of these determinations under
both Chapter 19 of NAFTA and the WTO dispute settlement
mechanisms.77 Although Canada was largely successful in its
appeals, the “two uncoordinated avenues for resolving disputes”
failed—perhaps unsurprisingly—to reach uniform resolutions
and allowed the parties to engage in “litigious gamesmanship”
that prolonged an already protracted dispute.78
1. Canada’s Success Under NAFTA
a. NAFTA’s Review of Commerce’s Affirmative Subsidy
Determination
Canada was successful in its NAFTA challenge to
Commerce’s final affirmative subsidy determination. The NAFTA
panel reviewing the determination found that while Canada’s

75

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,545 (Apr. 2, 2002); U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,539 (Apr. 2, 2002).
76
Softwood Lumber from Canada, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414, 731-TA-928, 67 Fed.
Reg. 36,022 (May 22, 2002) (final).
77
North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination, at 5, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Lumber
IV Subsidy NAFTA Panel Decision]; Panel Report, United States—Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada, ¶ 1.1, WT/DS257/R (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Lumber IV Subsidy WTO
Panel Report].
78
Cone, supra note 74, at 850.
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stumpage program constituted a financial contribution,79 the
evidence Commerce relied on did not reveal the existence of a
benefit. Accordingly, the panel ruled that the imports had not
received an actionable subsidy.80 What resulted was a game of
“ping-pong” between Commerce and the panel, where the panel
would remand the determination, and Commerce would revise
its methodology.81 The result of each revised subsidy
determination was a reduction in the CVD rate, and by the time
Commerce issued its fifth subsidy finding, it had determined
that the benefit given to Canadian producers was de minimis in
nature.82 Essentially, Commerce was forced to reluctantly accept
the panel’s determination that Canada’s provisional stumpage
programs did not confer a benefit on softwood lumber producers,
and thus that no actionable subsidy existed.
b. NAFTA’s Review of the ITC’s Affirmative Injury
Determination
Canada was also largely successful in its challenge to the
ITC’s affirmative threat of injury determination. According to a
NAFTA panel, there was insufficient evidence to support the
ITC’s finding.83 Following this decision, another series of
remands ensued. This time, however, the panel “lost patience
with the game [of ping-pong],”84 refused to remand for further reevaluation, and ordered the ITC to enter a finding of no material
injury.85 From NAFTA’s perspective, a U.S. agency had, again,
improperly applied its domestic trade laws and improperly
subjected Canadian imports of softwood lumber to CVDs.
79

Lumber IV Subsidy NAFTA Panel Decision, supra note 77, at 20. Under
U.S. trade law, for a subsidy to be actionable via the imposition of countervailable
duties, it must result in both a financial contribution and a benefit to the recipients of
the subsidy. Id. at 17.
80
Id. at 35.
81
Knox, supra note 14, at 437.
82
North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of Softwood Lumber from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination, at 4, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Mar. 17, 2006).
83
North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of Softwood Lumber from Canada: Final Affirmative Threat of Material Injury
Determination, at 107, USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Sept. 5, 2003).
84
Knox, supra note 14, at 437.
85
North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of Softwood Lumber from Canada: Final Affirmative Threat of Injury
Determination, at 7, USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Aug. 31, 2004). The panel noted that,
“The Commission has made it abundantly clear . . . that it is simply unwilling to accept
this Panel’s review authority under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA and has consistently
ignored the authority of this Panel in an effort to preserve its finding of threat of
material injury.” Id. at 3.
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The United States launched an Extraordinary
Challenge to both of the NAFTA panel rulings, but the ECC
upheld the panel’s injury ruling86 and, prior to its decision on
the panel’s subsidy finding, the two parties agreed to the terms
of the 2006 SLA, which ended the challenge.87
Although Canada emerged victorious in the NAFTA
rulings, simply cutting off one of the hydra’s heads does not slay
the beast. Indeed, Canada’s challenges to the United States’
subsidy determinations also took place under the WTO dispute
settlement process. Unfortunately, with no clear roadmap in
place to outline the legal relationship between NAFTA and WTO
dispute settlement systems,88 the WTO proceedings ran the risk
of being, at best, tedious and, at worst, contradictory.
2. Mixed Results at the WTO
a. The WTO’s Review of Commerce’s Affirmative
Subsidy Determination
Canada’s WTO arguments regarding Commerce’s
affirmative subsidy determination “mirrored” its arguments
before the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel.89 Similar to the NAFTA
panel, both a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) agreed
with the United States that the Canadian stumpage programs
constituted a financial contribution under WTO subsidy law.90
Yet while NAFTA ruled decisively that the subsidy did not
benefit Canadian producers—making it non-actionable—the
WTO ruling on this issue is less clear.
Although the WTO Panel sided with Canada and ruled
that the United States used an improper methodology to
86

North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Opinion and Order of the
Extraordinary Challenge Committee, at 2, ECC-2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005).
Notably, the panel held that “in rare circumstances,” a Panel may remand to the
Commission with instructions to enter a decision that the evidence on the record does
not support a threat of material injury. Id. at 15.
87
Notice of Suspension of Extraordinary Challenge Committee, 71 Fed. Reg.
28,854 (May 18, 2006).
88
See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. In addition to there being no
overarching statute that defines the relation between PTA and WTO tribunals, domestic
law concepts such as res judicata, lis pendens, and forum non conveniens, which address
overlapping authority, do not apply in the NAFTA/WTO context where the two panels are,
strictly speaking, applying different law. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 19, at 102-13.
89
Quayat, supra note 37, at 135.
90
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 76,
WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Lumber IV Subsidy WTO AB Report].
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determine that Canada’s stumpage programs resulted in a
benefit, the AB reversed this ruling.91 Nevertheless, this
reversal focused on the WTO Panel’s flawed reasoning, leaving
open the question of whether a benefit existed.92 Indeed, due to
an “insufficient factual basis to complete the legal analysis,”
the AB was unable to definitively determine whether Canada’s
financial contribution had produced a benefit and thus was
unable to determine whether both elements for an actionable
subsidy existed.93 An issue that a NAFTA panel determined
decisively was therefore left unresolved at the WTO.
For the United States to successfully defend its
affirmative subsidy determination at the WTO, Commerce also
needed to show that the alleged subsidies to timber harvesters
“pass[ed]-through” to the producers of the softwood lumber
imported into the United States.94 Following several WTO Panel
and AB reports,95 the AB eventually found against Commerce on
this point, ruling that Commerce had conducted a defective
pass-through analysis and had failed to comply with its WTO
obligations.96 This marked yet another victory for Canada.
b. The WTO’s Review of the ITC’s Affirmative Injury
Determination
Canada’s challenge to the ITC’s injury determination
before the WTO was again similar to its challenges brought
under NAFTA. Canada attempted to persuade the WTO that
the ITC’s affirmative threat of injury finding was not supported
by proper evidence.97 A WTO Panel sided with Canada, ruling
that an “objective and unbiased decision maker” could not have
properly found a threat of injury based upon the evidence
presented to the ITC.98 But, the Panel denied Canada’s requests
91

Id. ¶ 119.
Id. ¶ 122.
93
Id.
94
Cone, supra note 74, at 847.
95
These included: (i) an August 19, 2003 Panel Report, (ii) a January 19, 2004
Appellate Body Report, and (iii) an August 1, 2005 Panel Report. Id. at 848.
96
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 96,
WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005). The AB upheld the panel’s findings that Article 10 of
the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 require a pass-through analysis
in circumstances in which a subsidy is received by a harvester, and CVDs are then
attached to the imports from an unrelated producer. Id.
97
Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/R, ¶¶ 4.2-4.62 (Mar. 22, 2004).
98
Id. ¶ 7.89.
92
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to recommend that the United States revoke its final
determination of threat of injury, stop the application of duties,
and return the cash deposits already collected.99 Neither the
United States nor Canada appealed the Panel’s decision, but
the U.S. response to the ruling gave rise to one of the most
controversial events of Lumber IV.100 This suspect response
underscored both the lengths the United States was willing to
go to protect its softwood lumber industry and the
opportunities for manipulation available within overlapping
dispute settlement forums.101
3. The United States Uses a WTO Defeat to Mitigate
Adverse NAFTA Rulings
After the WTO Panel’s ruling that no threat of injury
existed, the ITC undertook a new injury determination and
again concluded that a substantial increase of Canadian
softwood lumber imports presented a threat of material injury
to the U.S. industry.102 From the United States’ perspective, this
“new” affirmative injury finding meant that earlier rulings by
multiple
NAFTA
panels—finding
the
ITC’s
injury
determination to be unsubstantiated by the evidence—were
now moot because the ITC had made, and Commerce had
adopted, a new finding.103 Put differently, the United States
attempted to “use[] a WTO defeat to justify ignoring several
adverse NAFTA Panel findings.”104
Canada challenged the ITC’s new threat of injury
finding at the WTO, but its legitimacy was never definitively
ascertained. First, a WTO Panel ruled that the ITC had cured
the defects identified in the original WTO ruling, which in

99

Id. ¶¶ 8.7-8.8.
Quayat, supra note 37, at 134.
101
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 581.
102
U.S. Trade Rep., WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding
Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from
Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,687 (June 24, 2005). Under U.S. law, WTO rulings do not
automatically bind the Executive. Rather, Section 129 of the Uruguay Round
Amendments Act allows the U.S. Trade Representative to request that the ITC “issue a
determination in connection with the particular proceeding that would render the
Commission’s action . . . not inconsistent with the findings of the panel or Appellate
Body.” 19 U.S.C § 3538(a)(4) (2006).
103
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Amendment to Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Orders on Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,916,
75,917 (Dec. 20, 2004); Quayat, supra note 37, at 134.
104
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 581.
100
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essence affirmed the ITC’s new injury determination.105 The AB,
however, set aside this ruling, finding that the Panel had
applied an improper standard of review and had failed to
perform a complete analysis.106 But the AB did not complete the
analysis itself.107 The AB reasoned that “completing the
analysis . . . would require us to review extensive aspects of the
[ITC]’s threat of injury and causation analyses, and would
require us to engage in a comprehensive examination of highly
complex and contested facts.”108 In the end, the AB was “unable
to make a recommendation to the Dispute Settlement Body,”
and the validity of the ITC’s “new” injury determination was
never definitively settled under WTO law.109
Although U.S. attempts to nullify the adverse NAFTA
rulings were deemed improper once the issue reached the
United States Court of International Trade (CIT),110 the
discordant overlap between NAFTA’s and the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanisms allowed the United States to—at least
temporarily—disregard a PTA dispute settlement panel’s
rulings under the guise of complying with the rules of the
multilateral trading system. Among the dangers associated with
incongruous legal forums, this is perhaps the most alarming.
B.

New Allegations—Dumping Claims Under NAFTA
Chapter 19 and the WTO

In addition to allegations of illegal subsidies, Lumber IV
also included, for the first time, a dumping claim against
Canadian lumber producers.111 This claim ultimately turned on
105

Reversing its earlier finding, the Panel was unable to “conclude that an
objective and unbiased investigation authority could not find that [the evidence]
supported the conclusion reached by the USITC.” Panel Report, United States—
Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, ¶ 7.39, WT/DS277/RW (Nov. 15, 2005).
106
Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation of the International
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Canada, ¶ 138, WT/DS277/AB/RW (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Lumber IV
Injury WTO AB Report].
107
The AB only has the authority to “uphold, modify, or reverse the findings”
of a WTO Panel. There is no provision at the WTO for remand with instructions. “This
means that the legal issue involved can be resolved only if the [AB] completes the
analysis itself.” DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 54 (2008).
108
Lumber IV Injury WTO AB Report, supra note 105, ¶ 160.
109
Id. ¶ 163.
110
See infra Part II.D.
111
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 569. Dumping occurs under U.S. law when
a foreign producer sells an export in the United States at a price lower than its home
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the United States’ use of a controversial practice known as
“zeroing,” which often results in higher margins with respect to
dumping calculations.112 As with Canada’s challenges to the
United States’ subsidy determinations, Canada appealed to two
independent dispute settlement bodies in order to resolve a
single claim. After the AB upheld a WTO Panel ruling that sided
with Canada and found that the United States’ use of zeroing
was a violation of the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement,113 a
NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel essentially incorporated the WTO’s
decision and directed Commerce to make a determination on
dumping without using the zeroing technique.114 While the two
dumping rulings were consistent with one another, the
duplicative litigation again highlights the inefficiency that
plagued Lumber IV.115
C.

Investor-State Claims Under NAFTA Chapter 11

Adding to the “[s]paghetti bowl of WTO and NAFTA
proceedings,”116 Lumber IV also included claims under NAFTA

market price. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006). Dumping investigations are conducted much
in the same way as subsidy investigations. See supra note 10.
112
When zeroing is applied,
the analysis treats the margins for transactions made at [less than fair value]
(dumped) in accordance with the actual amounts (positive numbers), while
transactions with dumping margins of less than zero (that is, made at more
than fair value) are treated as zero rather than as negative numbers. Under
such circumstances, higher non-dumped export prices do not offset the lower
dumped export prices.
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 574. This has the potential to inflate the margins of
dumping. Id.
113
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 117, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004).
114
North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final Affirmative
Antidumping Determination, at 2, USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (June 9, 2005).
115
See, e.g., Lysons, supra note 66, at 423-24 (arguing that Canada’s litigation
strategy in Lumber IV “increased costs to both Canadian and American taxpayers” and
added to “the political tensions between the two countries . . . [making] settlement
negotiations difficult”). The Canadian federal government spent an estimated $13
million on softwood legal fees from 2005 to 2006 alone. Sources indicate that when one
combines the spending of the Canadian federal government, the provinces, individual
forest companies, and forest lobby groups, the figure rises to more than $300 million
over the course of Lumber IV. Sylvain Larocque, Legal Tab in Lumber Battle May Hit
$300M, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 30, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.thestar.com/
news/canada/article/113100--legal-tab-in-lumber-battle-may-hit-300m.
116
Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTONAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ Is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 197 (2006). The term “spaghetti
bowl,” when discussing international trade, has been attributed to Professor Jagdish
Bhagwati and is meant to describe the chaotic scene that results from multiple trade
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Chapter 11.117 Three Canadian lumber producers initiated
separate arbitration proceedings against the United States,118
alleging that its conduct in investigating and imposing of AD
and CVD orders had violated their rights to national
treatment,119 most-favored-nation treatment,120 and the
minimum standard of treatment guaranteed under customary
international law.121 In the end, the arbitral tribunal found that
Chapter 11 does not encompass claims where the allegations
confront the administration of trade remedy laws.122 In other
words, the parties could not use Chapter 11 as an end run
around Chapter 19.123
Although this ruling prevented yet another decision on
the legitimacy of the United States’ use of its trade laws, the
simple initiation of arbitration proceedings during Lumber IV
is another example of the seemingly endless cycle of litigation
that the participants faced. It was not until after the dispute
reached U.S. courts that a final disposition was achieved. To
the chagrin of many, however, this finality would not come by
agreements crisscrossing one another like spaghetti noodles. See, e.g., BHAGWATI, supra
note 1, at 61. Lumber IV is a prime example of this confusion.
117
NAFTA Chapter 11 deals with investor-state arbitrations and contains
provisions designed to protect cross-border investors and facilitate the settlement of
investment disputes. NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 1101-138.
118
Tembec, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of
Arbitration Claim (NAFTA 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/27805.pdf; Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration
(NAFTA 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31360.pdf;
Canfor v. United States, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim (NAFTA 2002),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13203.pdf.
119
“Each Party shall accord to investors [and investments of investors] of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own investors [and investments of its own investors] . . . .” NAFTA, supra note 18,
at art. 1102(1)-(2).
120
“Each Party shall accord to investors [and investments of investors] of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to investors [investments of investors] of any other Party or of a non-Party . . . .” Id. at
art. 1103(1)-(2).
121
“Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.” Id. at art. 1105(1).
122
Canfor v. United States; Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States,
Decision on Preliminary Question, ¶ 273 (NAFTA 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/67753.pdf [hereinafter Canfor Arbitration Decision].
123
See Quayat, supra note 37, at 132-33. The SLA 2006 resulted in the
withdrawal of all claims under NAFTA Chapter 11. See SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art.
XI(2) (“The operation and application of Section B of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA is
hereby suspended with respect to any matter arising under the SLA 2006 and any
measure taken by a Party that is necessary to give effect to or implement the SLA
2006. Consequently, no claim under Section B of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA may be
made against a Party by investors of the United States or Canada in respect of any
such matter or measure.”).
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way of judicial disposition, but rather through a negotiated
settlement—calling into question the purpose of the previous
five years’ battles.124
D.

The End of Litigation—Claims Under United States
Law

By the time the parties agreed to the “Basic Terms” of
the SLA, the softwood lumber saga had entered a third arena:
the CIT. Litigation involving a single trade dispute was now
pending in three separate forums. But with Canada poised to
claim victory, a deal was struck, and the SLA 2006 brought an
end to litigation before the effects of the CIT’s rulings were
realized.125 Nevertheless, it is important to briefly address the
two principal issues that were raised before the CIT, adding to
the complexity of Lumber IV.
First, several interested Canadian private and
governmental parties brought suit to have the so-called “Byrd
Amendment” struck down.126 The amendment called for the
distribution of AD/CVD duties directly to members of an
industry that successfully obtained protection under U.S. trade
law.127 This essentially created a financial incentive for
companies to file trade remedy petitions.128 The CIT sided with
Canada and halted future distributions under the Byrd
Amendment for actions brought against NAFTA parties.129 The
United States eventually repealed the amendment, which
made it clear to the Lumber Coalition that further litigation
would not result in the direct delivery of any money to the U.S.
lumber industry.130
Second, another group of Canadian private and
governmental parties sought to challenge what they
characterized as an unlawful exercise of statutory authority by
124

See, e.g., Eliot J. Feldman, Deal or No Deal: Snatching Defeat from the
Jaws of Victory, 13 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 91, 95 (2007) (arguing that “instead of
winning free trade through legal proceedings, including a confirmation that Canadian
provincial governments do not subsidise softwood lumber production or exports,
Canada accepted draconian managed trade for potentially nine years”).
125
See infra Part III.
126
Can. Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1333-34 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2008).
127
19 U.S.C. § 1675c (repealed 2006).
128
Quayat, supra note 37, at 138.
129
Can. Lumber Trade Alliance, 517 F.3d at 1344 (affirming a 2006 CIT
declaratory judgment that the Byrd Amendment did “not apply to antidumping and
countervailing duties assessed on imports of goods from Canada or Mexico”).
130
Feldman, supra note 124, at 91.
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the United States in its attempts to evade NAFTA panel
rulings under the guise of implementing a WTO panel
decision.131 A three-judge CIT panel, headed by the Chief
Justice, ruled that Section 129—the tool that the United States
used in its attempt to moot the NAFTA Panels’ adverse rulings
on the ITC’s threat of injury findings—did not permit the
substitution of a new injury determination to support existing
duty orders.132 Consequently, the court validated the original
NAFTA rulings, which held that the United States’ CVD/AD
orders were improper, and it found that NAFTA panel review
had the same legal effect as review in a U.S. court.133 The
United States was, therefore, without a legal basis for
maintaining its CVD/AD orders, and the Canadian parties
were “entitled to a full refund of the deposits collected on
softwood lumber.”134 The United States had, in effect,
improperly collected over $5 billion worth of deposits.135
Over the course of Lumber IV, a disagreement over the
lawfulness of differing forest management systems produced
nearly thirty international and domestic decisions.136 The
discordant dispute settlement mechanisms gave Canada
multiple “bites at the apple” and permitted both superfluous
and disingenuous litigation.137 Nevertheless, it finally appeared
that the CIT’s decisions would allow Canada to claim a definite
victory. Yet with this end in sight,138 it was the negotiating table,
not the courtroom, that finally brought Lumber IV to a close.
131

See supra Part II.A.3; see also Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp.
2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the United States has
illegally continued to enforce antidumping (‘AD’) and countervailing duty (‘CVD’)
orders following the illegal implementation of an affirmative injury determination
issued by the ITC pursuant to section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(‘URAA’).”).
132
Tembec, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 (“Because section 129 only applies where
the United States has lost before the WTO, Congress expected that adoption of WTO
recommendations with respect to an ITC determination would result in determinations
revoking all or part of an existing order, if implementation were necessary at all.”
(emphasis added)).
133
Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1364 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
134
Quayat, supra note 37, at 143; see also Tembec, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1367
(“The legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not set up a system to retain
duties that are not owed.”).
135
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 553.
136
See Quayat, supra note 37, at 116. Quayat counts twenty-six NAFTA
(including panel and appellate body) and WTO decisions. Combined with the various
decisions of the CIT, this number rises to nearly thirty.
137
Lysons, supra note 66 at 423.
138
The Canadian government appears to disagree with this proposition.
Canada pressed its softwood lumber industry to accept the SLA 2006 by arguing the
opposite: that litigation would never end. Feldman, supra note 124, at 95.
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“SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY”139—
THE TERMS OF THE 2006 SOFTWOOD LUMBER
AGREEMENT

On September 12, 2006, despite, or perhaps as a result
of,140 Canada’s legal victories during Lumber IV, Canadian and
American authorities signed the SLA 2006—a negotiated
settlement that ended the most recent and heavily litigated
round of the softwood lumber dispute.141 The impacts of the
agreement were twofold. First, it brought stability and clarity
to the dispute settlement process—much to the delight of those
involved in the Canadian-American softwood lumber trade.
And second, it removed much of the parties’ incentive to
address NAFTA’s shortcomings head on—which should raise
concerns for those who are committed to strengthening the
multilateral trading system. But before addressing the
conflicting impacts of the agreement and its subsequent
extension, it is important to first understand what the parties
actually agreed to.
A.

The United States Retains Its Spoils—The Issue of Duty
Deposits

Despite the CIT’s determination that Canada was
entitled to a full refund of the deposits collected on softwood
lumber,142 the SLA 2006 failed to deliver such a result.143 Under
the terms of the agreement, the United States agreed to revoke
its AD/CVD orders and refund approximately $4.5 billion144 in
deposits it collected since 2002.145 The United States, therefore,
was permitted to retain $1 billion of illegally collected duties.146
This included $500 million to the members of the Lumber
Coalition, which some viewed as “a reward for
139

Id. at 91.
See Quayat, supra note 37, at 144-46 (arguing that rather than using
“litigation as a path to victory,” Canada used “litigation as a negotiating tool,” and
“secured a sufficiently broad range of legal victories to create a significant incentive for
the [United States] to find a negotiated settlement”).
141
SLA 2006, supra note 2; Quayat, supra note 37, at 116.
142
See supra Part II.D.
143
SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. III-IV.
144
Softwood Lumber: Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement—
Backgrounder, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT’L TRADE CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/
controls-controles/softwood-bois_oeuvre/notices-avis/agreement-accord.aspx?lang=eng&view=d
(last modified Feb. 13, 2012).
145
SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. III-IV.
146
Id. at Annex 2C(5).
140
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sponsoring . . . illegal trade actions” and a “nest egg that will
finance future trade harassment,”147 and $450 million for a
“meritorious initiatives” account, which was viewed as “a gift” to
the U.S. government.148 Needless to say, this outcome was deeply
problematic for opponents of the settlement.149
B.

Canada Agrees to Less than Free-Trade—The Issue of
Export Measures

The SLA 2006 has also been criticized for codifying
protectionist trade remedies.150 Under the agreement, various
regions in Canada are subject to a three-tier tariff or a tariffrated quota system.151 When lumber prices are below $315 per
unit, Canadian lumber exporters pay either: (a) a 15% export
tax, or (b) a 5% tax accompanied by a volume restraint on
exports.152 As the price of lumber increases, export charges
decline and export quotas increase.153 Only when lumber prices
go over $355 per unit is lumber imported without export
charges or volume restraints.154 As those opposed to extending
the agreement point out, “the price [of lumber] has risen above
the $355 threshold only once” since 2006, meaning that the
147

Softwood Lumber Deal: Hearing Before the Standing Comm. on Int’l Trade,
39th Parliament 1st Sess. at 5 (2006) (statement of Mr. Normand Rivard, Council
Chair, United Steelworkers), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/
Committee/391/CIIT/Evidence/EV2326139/CIITEV23-E.PDF [hereinafter Canadian
Parliament Softwood Lumber Hearing].
148
Id. at 2 (statement of Dr. Elliot Feldman, Trade Lawyer, Baker &
Hostetler LLP); see also SLA 2006, supra note 2, at Annex 2C(5).
149
See Feldman, supra note 124, at 94 (arguing that “had litigation continued
on its course without extra-legal interference from the two sovereign governments . . . ,
Canadian industry would have received back all of its money and the [U.S.] industry
would have received none”). Eventually, however, Mr. Feldman (or at least the clients
he represents) came to support extending the SLA 2006. That support was based on the
fact that “Canada’s softwood lumber industry paid a very significant initiation fee for
the SLA, $1 billion,” and “in light of its prior payment and sacrifice, now looks to
whatever continuing benefits may be derived from the SLA according to its already
agreed terms.” Letter from Elliot J. Feldman, Baker & Hostetler LLP, on behalf of the
Ontario Forest Indus. Assoc. and the Conseil de l’Industrie Forestière du Québec, to
Mary Sullivan Smith, Dir. for Can. Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. (Oct. 6, 2011),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-2011-0011-0002
(follow “View Attachment: PDF” hyperlink).
150
Soft in Wood and Head U.S.-Canadian Lumber Deal Makes a Mockery of
Free Trade, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006, at 6 [hereinafter Soft in Wood and Head]
(arguing that “[i]f private companies were to attempt, on their own, to strike this kind
of anti-competitive deal, they would be rightly hauled before [U.S.] and Canadian
authorities. Yet the latter can call it managed trade, and get away with it.”).
151
SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. VII.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.

188

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1

vast majority of softwood lumber imported from Canada has
arrived subject to trade restrictive duties and volume
restraints.155 This fact gives credence to those who argue that
the agreement is one that would make the “Comecon officials of
the Soviet era look like relative Friedmanites.”156
C.

Slaying the Softwood Hydra—The Issue of Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms

The proliferation of PTAs and the lack of legal certainty
governing their relationship with WTO dispute settlement
mechanisms have negatively affected the softwood lumber
dispute by providing the parties with a near endless recourse to
dissonant legal forums. The SLA 2006 mitigates this problem
by streamlining the dispute settlement process.157
If the parties fail to “arrive at a satisfactory resolution
of the matter” through consultations, the agreement authorizes
the parties to arbitrate the matter in the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA).158 Moreover, the SLA 2006
specifically protects against the potential for overlapping
adjudication. For the duration of the agreement, “neither Party
shall initiate any litigation or dispute settlement proceedings
with respect to any matter arising under the SLA 2006,
including proceedings pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization or Chapter Twenty
of the NAFTA.”159 Additionally, the United States is not
permitted to “self-initiate” any AD or CVD investigations for
the duration of the agreement, and private parties involved in
various lawsuits were forced to consent in writing to terminate
all outstanding NAFTA and domestic legal proceedings.160
These provisions limit adjudication of the softwood lumber
155

Letter from Gerald M. Howard, Pres. & CEO, Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders, to Mary Sullivan Smith, Dir. for Can. Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.
(Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR2011-0011-0003 (follow “View Attachment: PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter Howard,
USTR Comment] (labeling homebuilders, remodelers, and homebuyers as “downstream
consumers”).
156
Soft in Wood and Head, supra note 150, at 6.
157
SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XIV.
158
Id. at art. XIV(4)-(6). This procedure is “unusual” in that the LCIA is
known as a nongovernmental commercial arbitration institution that typically
administers matters between private parties as opposed to sovereign governments.
John R. Crook, United States and Canada Arbitrate a Softwood Lumber Dispute in the
London Court of International Arbitration, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 192, 192 (2008).
159
SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XIV(2).
160
Id. at art. V & Annex 2A.
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dispute to a single forum, the LCIA, effectively “slay[ing] the
softwood lumber hydra.”161
D.

Agree to Disagree—Disputes Under the SLA 2006

Despite successfully addressing one of the major
problems facing Lumber IV, the SLA 2006 was not designed to
resolve the underlying legal issues of the dispute. The positions
of both parties—with regard to the validity of the United
States’ AD/CVD orders and the legal effect of courts’ or other
dispute settlement bodies’ decisions regarding those orders—
were explicitly reserved.162 Therefore, it is not surprising that
limiting the forums in which disputes can arise has not ended
all conflict with regard to the softwood lumber dispute.
To date, the United States has filed three separate
Requests for Arbitration under the SLA 2006, and decisions in
each case indicate that the LCIA is an effective tribunal.163 The
first request by the United States protested Canada’s alleged
failure to properly calculate export quotas during the first six
months of 2007.164 The tribunal largely sided with the United
States, ruling that Canada had failed to properly calculate
quotas on exports from certain regions and consequently
ordering Canada to impose an additional 10% charge on
exports from those regions.165
Separately, another tribunal was formed in response to
the United States’ request to consider whether certain
provincial assistance programs—which Quebec and Ontario
put into place to aid Canadian softwood lumber producers and
exporters—breached Canada’s obligation under the anticircumvention provisions of the SLA 2006.166 The tribunal again
agreed with the United States, finding that certain measures
161

Knox, supra note 14, at 436. See generally Lysons, supra note 66, at 430
(noting that the dispute settlement provision of the SLA 2006 is “evidence of lessons
learned in the softwood lumber dispute”).
162
SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XI(1).
163
See Lysons, supra note 66, at 431 tbl.2 (noting the faster schedule
stipulated in the SLA 2006 as compared to NAFTA and the WTO).
164
United States v. Canada, Request for Arbitration, ¶¶ 12-14 (LCIA Aug. 13,
2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/us_request_for_arbitration.pdf.
165
United States v. Canada, Case No. 7941, Award on Remedies, at 148 (LCIA
Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/award_on_remedy.pdf.
166
United States v. Canada, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 4 (LCIA Jan. 18,
2008), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/provincial_us_request_for_arbitration.pdf.
The “Anti-circumvention” provision of the SLA 2006 states that “[n]either
Party . . . shall take action to circumvent or offset the commitments under the SLA
2006.” SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XVII.
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taken by Canada violated its obligations under the agreement.167
Yet, the tribunal sided with Canada on how to calculate the
remedy and granted significantly less compensation than was
initially sought by the United States.168 Following this ruling,
both Canada and the United States offered their continued
support for the agreement.169 Given the litigious back and forth of
Lumber IV, these responses are encouraging.170
The most recent Request for Arbitration, brought by the
United States in early 2011, involved U.S. allegations that
timber harvested from public lands in British Columbia’s
interior region was being sold at prices below those provided
for under the timber pricing system, which was grandfathered
under the SLA 2006.171 Canada fought these allegations,
arguing that the increased amount of low-priced timber from
British Columbia was the result of a mountain pine beetle
infestation and was not a violation of the SLA 2006’s anticircumvention provisions.172 In July of 2012, the LCIA sided
with Canada and dismissed the U.S. claims in their entirety.173
Although the Lumber Coalition was “very disappointed” with
the ruling, it has reiterated its “respect and appreciat[ion] [for]
the efforts of [the LCIA] and the U.S. government to grapple
with the complex issues involved in this case.”174

167

United States v. Canada, Case No. 81010, Award, ¶ 415 (LCIA Jan. 20,
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2573.
168
Id.
169
Barrie McKenna, Lumber Deal Still A Good One Despite New Arbitration
Loss, Ottawa Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Jan. 21, 2011; Lumber Deal is Safe, Emerson
has Heard, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 2008, at B2 (noting that the Canadian trade
minister received assurances from the United States Trade Representative that the
SLA 2006 was safe). Following the ruling, the president of the Quebec Forest Industry
Council stated that, “[t]he Canadian government has indicated it intends to comply
with the ruling and impose the additional export charges by the end of February
[2011].” U.S. Prevails in Lumber Dispute with Canada, But Falls Short on Remedy, 29
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 28, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1763804.
170
See supra Part II.
171
United States v. Canada, Case No. 111790, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 4
(LCIA Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2484.
172
United States v. Canada, Case No. 111790, Canada’s Response to Request for
Arbitration, ¶¶ 1-6 (LCIA, Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.international.gc.ca/controlscontroles/assets/pdfs/softwood/Resp_Req_%20Arbitration_Can_2011_02_17%20.pdf
(alleging that the United States has attempted to “create a violation of the SLA out of the
devastation inflicted on the forests of British Columbia by the Mountain Pine Beetle”).
173
United States v. Canada, Case No. 111790, Final Award, ¶ 439 (LCIA July 26,
2012), http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/111790.pdf.
174
Press Release, U.S. Lumber Coal., U.S. Lumber Coalition Disappointed by
Arbitral Decision Regarding British Columbia Softwood Lumber Agreement Timber
Pricing Violations (July 18, 2012), available at http://www.uslumbercoalition.org/
doc/press_release_07-18-12.pdf.
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Despite these continued disputes, the extension of the
SLA 2006 offers the best hope for lumber peace to both Canada
and the United States. Without first addressing the underlying
conflicts between the dispute settlement mechanisms in NAFTA
and the WTO, a return of the softwood lumber hydra, in the
form of a prospective “Lumber V,” would force the parties back
into a costly and ineffective system of trade litigation.
IV.

WHY THE 2006 SOFTWOOD LUMBER AGREEMENT IS
RIGHT FOR SOFTWOOD LUMBER

Supporters of the SLA 2006 extension argued that it has
“brought an element of stability and predictability to trade in
softwood lumber products.”175 Those who wished to see it expire
derided it as protectionist and claimed that it “reduces the
incentive for the U.S. [lumber] producers . . . to increase
production and improve efficiency of their mills so as to be
internationally competitive,” which ultimately has a negative
economic effect on consumers.176 While there is truth to both of
these statements, a negotiated agreement that streamlines the
dispute settlement process is necessary to offset the United
States’ aggressive support for its softwood lumber industry.
Furthermore, although the SLA 2006 is not a complete victory
for either country, new trading partners have the potential to
alleviate the remaining tensions between the parties, increasing
the likelihood that the SLA 2006 extension will bring internal
peace to the softwood lumber dispute.
A.

A Stable and Predictable Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Is Needed to Offset the United States’ Obdurate Political
Protection of Its Softwood Lumber Industry

An exasperated Prime Minister Jean Chretien once
reminded President George W. Bush, “You want gas, you want
oil and you don’t want wood? It’s too bad, but if you have free

175

Letter from David A. Yocis et al., Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, on behalf of the
U.S. Lumber Coal., to Mary Sullivan Smith, Dir. for Can. Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade
Rep. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-2011-00110004 (follow “View Attachment: PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter Yocis, USTR Comment].
176
Howard, USTR Comment, supra note 155 (labeling homebuilders,
remodelers, and homebuyers as “downstream consumers”). The National Association of
Home Builders, whose members construct approximately 80% of the new homes built
each year in the United States, is a trade association whose “mission is to enhance the
climate for housing and the building industry.” Id.
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trade, you have free trade.”177 While this statement is
theoretically sound, in reality trade does not exist in isolation,
and when it is influenced by political favoritism, economic logic
does not always prevail.178 The United States has shown
tremendous political resolve in its commitment to protect its
softwood lumber industry and has brazenly used controversial
litigation tactics in order to stretch the limits of that protection.
Conversely, such steadfastness does not exist north of the
border. Until U.S. resolve is weakened or until the overlapping
dispute settlement mechanisms of global trade are
disentangled in a way that prevents disingenuous litigation, a
negotiated agreement with a single dispute resolution forum is
the only outcome capable of guiding softwood lumber through
the current mix of regionalism and multilateralism in the
international trading regime.
1. Political Support Within the United States for Trade
Restrictions on Canadian Softwood Lumber
Influential Senators from lumber-producing states, such
as Max Baucus (D-Mont.), have long expressed their desire for
a negotiated settlement to the lumber dispute in order to limit
imports of Canadian softwood products. In an attempt to
“spark a return . . . to the negotiating table,” Baucus went so
far as to introduce the Softwood Lumber Duties Liquidation
Act in 2004, which sought to liquidate $3 billion in Canadian
duty deposits prior to the resolution of ongoing legal appeals
surrounding those deposits.179 Although Canadian lumber
industry insiders downplayed the legislation, characterizing it as
a “message bill and not a serious threat,” evidence indicates that
past U.S. Presidents have responded to Senators’ softwood lumber
demands by supporting restrictions on imports of Canadian
177

Barry Brown, Lumber Dispute Could Affect State’s Imports of Canadian
Gas, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 23, 2001, at E1.
178
See, e.g., Daniel N. Adams, Comment, Back to Basics: The Predestined
Failure of NAFTA Chapter 19 and Its Lessons for the Design of International Trade
Regimes, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 205, 228 (2008) (noting that the SLA 2006 was a
bargain “heavily influenced by political considerations”). During a 2009 Canada-United
States Law Institute Conference on “North American Dispute Resolution,” John Terry,
a Canadian trade lawyer, argued that, “despite the dispute settlement mechanisms
[Canada has] put into place, realpolitik tends to continue to play the role it has always
or has traditionally played.” John A. Terry, Canadian Speaker, North American
Dispute Resolution, Proceedings of the Canadian-United States Law Institute
Conference (Apr. 2-4, 2009), in 34 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 416 (2010).
179
Baucus Pressures Canada on Lumber with Bill to Liquidate Duties, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 10906271.

2012]

SOFTWOOD LUMBER’S “TERMITE” PROBLEM

193

lumber.180 Indeed, evidence from both Lumber III and Lumber IV
shows that such demands were catalysts for trade restrictions.
After Canada notified the United States of its plans to
withdraw from the MOU signed during Lumber II,181 a group of
sixty-four Senators wrote a letter to the President, demanding
that the Administration take action against Canada.182 The
letter threatened that “if [diplomatic or trade] remedies are not
pursued, we are prepared to find a legislative remedy to fully
offset Canada’s timber subsidies.”183 Lumber III was initiated in
the immediate wake of this threat, with Commerce selfinitiating trade proceedings against Canada.184 Then, with the
SLA 1996 set to expire, a group of fifty-one Senators wrote to
the President, urging him “to make resolving the problem of
subsidized lumber imports from Canada a top trade priority.”185
The response to this petition was Lumber IV, launched on the
first business day after the 1996 agreement expired.186 At
minimum, these two letters coincided with major events in the
softwood lumber dispute and highlight the broad level of
political protection enjoyed by the U.S. lumber industry.187 Most
180

Id. In all four rounds of the softwood lumber dispute, Senators involved
themselves indirectly in the negotiations by writing letters to the President,
Commerce, and the USTR, urging them to resolve the dispute through negotiation with
Canada or by imposing trade restrictions. Daowei Zhang & David Laband, From
Senators to the President: Solve the Lumber Problem or Else, 123 PUB. CHOICE 393,
393-94 (2005) (conducting a roll call analysis to identify the factors influencing a
Senator’s willingness to sign letters demanding that the executive branch solve the
lumber problem and showing that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a
Senator’s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that
the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a Senator less likely to sign
these letters).
181
See supra Part I.B.
182
Zhang & Laband, supra note 180, at 397.
183
Id.
184
See supra Part I.C.
185
Zhang & Laband, supra note 180, at 399.
186
See supra Part II.
187
Commentators argue that these Senators are influenced by the highly
effective lobbying efforts of the Lumber Coalition. Zhang & Laband, supra note 180, at
407 (arguing that their findings are consistent with the “interest group theory of
political decision making” whereby a “small but concentrated softwood lumber industry
can successfully lobby their elected officials such as Senators and demand protection
from foreign competition, despite the fact that such protectionism harms the economic
welfare of the nation as a whole”). Although the Lumber Coalition has faced opposition
in its quest to impose trade penalties on Canadian lumber, primarily from the National
Association of Home Builders, the opposition has proven ineffective in its lobbying
efforts as compared to the Lumber Coalition. Id. at 396, 398. As recently as 2011,
Lumber Coalition officials have publicly stated that, “in the absence of an agreement
between the two governments, the Coalition would have no choice but to petition for
new antidumping and countervailing duty orders against unfairly traded softwood
lumber products from Canada.” Yocis, USTR Comment, supra note 175. Considering
the Lumber Coalition filed fresh AD/CVD petitions on the first business day after the
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recently, at least twenty-three members of Congress formally
offered their support for the SLA 2006 extension.188 In a letter
to the United States Trade Representative, these lawmakers
offered their support for extending the agreement in exchange
for an “iron clad commitment that any Canadian violations will
be addressed in a timely and effective manner.”189
2. Controversial Litigation Tactics Utilized by the
United States to Protect Its Softwood Lumber
Industry
In addition to overt political support for trade
restrictions, the United States has also proved willing to push
the legal envelope in its attempts to protect its domestic
softwood lumber industry. The most blatant example of this
controversial gamesmanship is evident from the United States’
attempt to moot the unfavorable NAFTA rulings regarding the
ITC’s injury determinations, under the guise of WTO
compliance.190 Although the CIT denounced this particular
practice,191 it is indicative of how far the U.S. government is
willing to go to protect domestic lumber interests.192 Until a
solution is found to deal with the discordant overlap of dispute
settlement mechanisms, other opportunities to thwart the
system will remain. Therefore, express agreements like the SLA
2006 are—at least for the time being—essential in providing
legal clarity and limiting the parties’ ability to manipulate the
incongruous relationship between NAFTA and the WTO.193

expiration of SLA 1996, the parties would be well served to give credence to these
warnings. See supra Part II. One commentator also notes that the SLA 2006 delivered
$500 million to the Lumber Coalition, “many times more than enough to protect its
interests,” which means the “[Lumber] Coalition is more than ready for trade action
were it to think more restraints needed.” Feldman, supra note 124, at 96.
188
Rossella Brevetti, 23 House Lawmakers Condition Support for Lumber
Pact Extension on Enforcement, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1755 (Oct. 27, 2011).
189
Id.
190
See supra Part II.A.3.
191
See supra Part II.D.
192
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 581; Quayat, supra note 37, at 134.
193
See Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 19, at 117 (arguing that the best short
term solution to address forum shopping among international tribunals is to regulate
overlaps with explicit treaty clauses).
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3. Canada’s Lackluster Response to the United States’
Steadfast Support of Its Lumber Industry
In contrast to the United States’ commitment to the
lumber trade, Canada’s support for its own lumber industry
does not appear as steadfast. During the negotiations of the
SLA 2006, some have argued that newly elected Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper prioritized restoring ties with
the Bush Administration over supporting the Canadian lumber
industry.194 Prior to announcing the SLA 2006, Canada had to
persuade most of its softwood lumber producers to refrain from
objecting publicly to an agreement that the industry did not
favor.195 Today, Canada continues to waver in its support.
Critics contend that the federal government “still strong-arms
provincial governments to change [their] forestry practices.”196
And the government has applauded British Columbia for
increasing the amount of its forest land put to auction.197 These
actions suggest that—despite numerous legal victories to the
contrary—the Canadian federal government believes that the
provinces do subsidize their production of exported lumber, and
they offer a contrast to the rigid support for the industry found
south of the border.198
In explaining why Canadian lumber producers
consented to the SLA 2006, the executive director of the
Alberta Forest Products Association stated, “We picked the
best of two bad situations.”199 This may be the most apt
description of the current agreement. Although far from
perfect, the SLA 2006 appeases U.S. demands for managed
trade and provides Canada with a degree of legal certainty
absent from the overlapping dispute settlement mechanism of
NAFTA and the WTO. And while Canada may still have
misgivings about its neighbor’s fickle free trade preferences,
new markets will provide Canada with options to escape the
restricted U.S. market, and they will offer the United States
relief from an otherwise continued influx of Canadian products.
194

Adams, supra note 178, at 228.
Feldman, supra note 124, at 91; Canadian Parliament Softwood Lumber
Hearing, supra note 147, at 5 (statement of Normand Rivard, Council Chair, United
Steelworkers) (opposing the SLA 2006).
196
Feldman, supra note 124, at 97.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Josie Newman, Timber Accord Rankles Canadian Firms, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 18, 2006, at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1018/
p07s02-woam.html.
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B.

New Lumber Markets Will Allow Canada and the
United States to Mitigate Any Lasting Tensions

Throughout much of the softwood lumber dispute, the
United States has been Canada’s only major export market for
softwood lumber.200 Recently, however, lumber exports to China
have grown significantly, and Canada’s reliance on the U.S.
market has declined.201 May 2011 was the first month in which
the value of softwood lumber from British Columbia exported
to China outstripped that exported to the United States.202
China’s purchases of softwood lumber from Canada grew from
9.04% of Canadian softwood exports in 2010 to 21.4% in 2011.203
This corresponded with a drop in Canada’s softwood exports to
the United States, from 66.71% of total exports in 2010 to
54.63% in 2011.204 This diversification of Canada’s lumber
market will only alleviate U.S. concerns that too much
Canadian lumber is entering its market, and it will provide the
Canadian lumber industry with alternative trading options if it
finds the terms of the SLA 2006 too onerous.
While critics abound, and future conflicts are sure to
emerge, the SLA 2006 both effectively slays the softwood lumber
hydra and appeases the obdurate demands of U.S. lawmakers.
Unfortunately, an unwanted side effect of this peace is that it
removes a major incentive to address the monstrous dispute
resolution system that exists beneath the softwood lumber
dispute. In short, while the SLA 2006 is a workable solution to
the softwood lumber dispute, it also adds to the perilous forces
undercutting the multilateral trading system.
V.

A PYRRHIC VICTORY—WHY THE SLA 2006 ADDS TO THE
FORCES UNDERCUTTING THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM

Before the SLA 2006 was signed, commentators
predicted that the new dispute settlement system proposed in
the agreement “spell[ed] the end of NAFTA’s [C]hapter 19, and

200

BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 553-54.
Forest Product Markets, NAT. RES. CAN., http://cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/pages/330
(last updated Oct. 22, 2012).
202
Jeremy Hainsworth, British Columbia Lumber Exports to China Outstrip
in Value Softwood Exports to U.S., 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1249 (July 28, 2011).
203
Id.
204
Id.
201
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in many ways the end of NAFTA itself.”205 If this were the
lasting impact of the SLA 2006, it would be cause for
celebration: a response to the failures of NAFTA would have
highlighted a major problem brought on by the proliferation of
PTAs—namely, discordant dispute resolution—and brought
about the demise of one of those problematic agreements.
Unfortunately, this did not occur, and Chapter 19 is still used
today.206 Indeed, since 2006, the most bitter trade dispute in
North America has been immunized from many of the problems
caused by the existence of PTAs. Unless Canada and the
United States recognize that the SLA 2006’s straightforward
dispute settlement mechanism is what has alleviated their
softwood lumber problems and choose to apply a similarly
coherent principle to the larger trading regime, the extension of
the SLA 2006 is, at most, a Pyrrhic victory.
A.

A Dispute Settlement Cacophony—The Problems with
Preferential Trade Agreements

Although some argue that “overlapping legal systems
[are] unavoidable” in today’s global landscape,207 the softwood
lumber dispute presents a telling example of the “wastefulness
and potential futility” of such overlap in hotly contested trade
disputes.208 Specifically, the unresolved fragmentation between
regionalism and multilateralism creates at least three serious
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problems for the current international trade dispute settlement
system.209
First, it prolongs the underlying dispute.210 Despite
numerous legal victories over the course of Lumber IV, it took
Canada over five years to slay the softwood lumber hydra.211
Moreover, the longer the dispute carried on, the more
opportunities there were for U.S. agencies to issue additional
determinations, each of which started the challenge process
anew.212 Second, when multiple forums address the same issue,
the possibility of inconsistent judgments increases.213 In
particular, state practices, such as the United States’ use of
zeroing, may be deemed valid in one forum and invalid in
another.214 Finally, the existence of multiple forums gives rise to
litigious gamesmanship. If a state is able to win even a partial
affirmation of an AD/CVD ruling, as the United States did at
the WTO during Lumber IV,215 its trade agencies may argue
that, notwithstanding adverse rulings in one forum, success in
another provides legal cover to ignore the unfavorable result.
During the course of the softwood lumber dispute, the
relationship among the various dispute settlement forums
spanned a “continuum from deference to defiance,”216 but there
was an ever-present possibility that one of the issues discussed
above would surface and derail any apparent progress. Canada
and the United States addressed this concern by drafting a
PTA sub-agreement, the SLA 2006, which effectively trumped
NAFTA and the WTO with a new dispute resolution
mechanism exclusively for softwood lumber disputes.217 As will
be shown below, this was a misguided attempt to solve a much
deeper problem.
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PTA Sub-Agreements Deter a Return to Multilateral
Trade

While PTAs have their own set of problems, the
additional risks of PTA sub-agreements are twofold. They both
pilfer from the finite amount of human and administrative
capital available to conduct trade agreements, and they remove
incentives to address the larger issues at stake.
One of critics’ main concerns with the proliferation of
PTAs is that their negotiation, ratification, implementation, and
enforcement come at the expense of the multilateral system.218
PTA sub-agreements take this problem one step further by
focusing additional human and administrative energy on
agreements that are further removed from multilateral objectives.
This would not be a cause for concern if these sub-agreements
solved the fundamental shortcomings of PTAs. Unfortunately,
agreements such as the SLA 2006 merely immunize certain key
industries from the drawbacks of PTAs while leaving others to
languish in an entangled mess of trade agreements.
The SLA 2006 acknowledges the problems with bilateral
agreements, yet it provides the largest trade dispute in
Canadian-American relations with immunity from those
problems. As of 2006, the “longest running and perhaps most
bitter trade dispute ever between the two countries” is no longer
saddled with a cacophony of dispute settlement mechanisms.219
With billions in trade now beyond the convoluted interplay
between NAFTA and the WTO, Canada and the United States
are that much less likely to address the problems of overlapping
jurisdiction.220 While the saying is that things get worse before
they get better, those in the multilateral trading community
might worry that PTA sub-agreements are an example of things
getting better before they get worse.
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CONCLUSION
Softwood lumber’s termite problem is an infestation
that concerns the entire trading community, and PTA subagreements are not the insecticide that the multilateral system
is waiting for. If Canada and the United States are to assist in
addressing the real issues at stake, they must look beyond
creating a solution only for lumber. Rather than allowing an
armistice in the softwood lumber dispute to serve as an excuse
to ignore the concerns surrounding PTAs, the two parties must
recognize why the SLA 2006 has been able to mitigate the
dispute and extend that rationale to the greater disconnect
between NAFTA and the WTO.
The SLA 2006 replaces a discordant dispute settlement
scheme with a straightforward and efficient arbitral tribunal.
Until Canada and the United States integrate a similar
solution into the larger trading system, the lessons of the
softwood lumber dispute will continue to go unheeded.
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